

PRIVACY AND GENOMIC RESEARCH

William W. Lowrance, Ph.D.
(lowrance@orange.fr)

SHIP Conference,
Exploiting Existing Data

St. Andrews, 10 September 2011

Objectives of genomic research

- Continue to explore genomic factors of health and disease
- Probe tumorigenesis and cancers in more depth (cancer being basically a genomic malfunction)
- Use as an R&D tool in developing preventive, diagnostic, and therapeutic techniques
- Characterize the human microbiome
- Over time, develop genomically personalized medicine and public health genomics.

A resource: Eric Green and NHGRI, "Charting a course for genomic medicine from base pairs to bedside," *Nature* 470, 204-213 (2011).

The challenges posed by the facts

The human genome:

- is extensive and breathtakingly fine-grained:
3,000,000,000 code-bits (the "bases" T, A, G, C)
- is intrinsic to the body and hardly changes during the lifetime, except in cancer cells
- is identically present in every cell of the body, except in red blood cells
- influences most personal attributes
- is unique to the individual, except for identical twins.

What genomic data look like

...TTTCCGTATGCGTAGCCACTTACCCTCCTAGTAGTAG...

through 3,000,000,000 of what statisticians might call data-cells, each carrying T, A, G, or C

Alteration, insertion, or deletion of just a few T, A, G, C can make a big difference, whether the genome is being considered as:

- a dynamic program-tape (of myriad "apps"), or
- a potentially identifying hyper-barcode.

What genomic data look like, *cont.*


at sequence scale: ...ATGTTGAAATCCGPCTCCCA...

at gene scale: insulin-like growth factor gene IGF2BP2


at body scale: red hair, heritable renal dysplasia

at family scale: ancestry, parentage, family health history,
descendants.


What genomic data look like, *cont.* – the chromosomes (22 + XX or XY)



What genomic data look like, *cont.* – a sequence "read"



What genomic data look like, *cont.* –
mutations at site 7q31.2 in the sequence from
17,120,016–17,308,718 that cause cystic fibrosis
(autosomal recessive, and several versions)



Sources of DNA and genomic data for research (overlapping)

- small, tightly focused studies
- research cohorts, biobanks, clinical trials
- existing clinical data and/or archived biospecimens
- newborn screening data and/or Guthrie bloodspots
- data-sharing platforms (WT Case Control Consortium, ALSPAC, NIH dbGaP, International Cancer Genomics Consortium, UK Data Archive...)

Example: UK Biobank

- Recruited 500,000 people from the four UK countries, oversampling some minority groups
- Gained broad consent, including permission to link to lifetime NHS Px and Rx data, registries, and other databases, and to genotype as needed
- Collected health and lifestyle data, performed physical exams, collected blood and urine (and from many participants, saliva)
- Conducted full eye exam on 100,000 participants
- Stores specimens in its own high-security -80° robot-retrieval biorepository in Manchester.

UK Biobank, *cont.*

- Operates via an Ethics and Governance Framework
- Is governed by a Board of Directors, and watched over by an independent Ethics and Governance Council (EGC)
- Is a resource to which scientists anywhere and in any sector can apply to use, via restricted access and contractual agreements. A Data Access Committee decides.
- Will be ready for research use soon.

Refs: <http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk>; and <http://www.egcukbiobank.org.uk>

Some challenges with consent in genomic research

- The science is very, very, very hard to comprehend, making "fully informed" consent in the classical sense impossible
- Broad consent can be essential:
 - to make masses of rich resources available for genomic studies (GWAS etc), and
 - to accommodate to the difficulty of precisely defining and limiting research "purposes."

Challenges with consent, *cont.*

- Often it is impossible to predict what findings may emerge, and what their implications may be
- Many findings (or at least the raw data for them) turn up "incidentally"
- Incidental findings can shock: "You know, that nice man you have always called 'Dad'?"

Challenges with consent, *cont.*

- It can be difficult to assess the risks of either identity or trait disclosure in advance, and so is difficult to provide fair notice of the proposition to which people consent
- Possibly, findings can be used against data-subjects' interests
- Findings can have implications (good or bad) for blood relatives, and for other relatives as well – whether or not with their consent
- Genotype data have strong implications for identifiability, a central concern when people are asked to consent.

Challenges with consent, *cont.*

So; there are problems with...

- Comprehensibility
- Breadth of consent
- Purpose specification and limitation
- Privacy risk assessment
- Provision of fair notice
- Incidental findings
- Implications for unaware and unconsenting relatives who may become data-subjects, de facto
- Identifiability.

Identifiability is pivotal!

- If data are identified or identifiable, they may be considered "personal" (or "personally identifiable," etc) data under law

"Personal data" means data which relate to a living individual who can be identified – (a) from those data, or (b) from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller... – UK Data Protection Act

- If they are personal data, consent and/or ethics review may be required
- This strongly affects data collecting, transfer, sharing, access, and use

The senses in which genotype data "identify"

- Genotype data don't "identity" in the name-and-address sense
- If fairly extensive, they are an intrinsic unique tag – which may help match or *single-out*
- And depending, they may allow inferring some descriptive characteristics – and thus *point-to*.

De-identifying genomic data for research

Tactics:

- (a) degrading the data before releasing
- (b) irreversibly de-identifying the data
- (c) separating the identifiers and key-coding.

De-identifying tactic (a): degrading the data before releasing

- can be done, such as by randomly substituting some A for T, or G for C
- almost always degrades usefulness, because most analyses depend on precise fine details.

De-identifying tactic (b): irreversibly de-identifying the data

- is occasionally done, such as:
 - when surveying the background occurrence of some heritable phenomenon
 - when cross-referencing data with corresponding biospecimens, and then destroying the identifiers and all links to the sources
- but obviously has limitations, because can't validate later or recontact.

De-identifying tactic (c): separating the identifiers and key-coding

- is used in all health research, including genomic research
- the equivalent can be performed via a complex data linkage system
- works well – *if* performed carefully, *if* the key is properly safeguarded, and *if* the use of the key to reconnect personal identifiers to the genotype data is strictly controlled
- because de-identification is a matter of degree, restrictions may still be needed, and safeguards are always needed.

The inverse direction:

Identifying non-identified genomic data

Tactics:

- (a) matching genotype to identified or identifiable reference genotype data
- (b) linking genomic+associated data (clinical, registry, etc) with other data
- (c) profiling, i.e. inferring likely appearance, ethnicity, health factors, behavior, or other traits from the genotype.

Identifying tactic (a): matching genotype to identified or identifiable reference genotype data

- may match to hospital, lab, police, military, research, or other collections
- may match to blood-relatives' genotype not in a collection
- is much more certain than matching via other attributes
- proven in criminal forensics and in identifying victims of war, terrorism, and disasters.

Identifying tactic (b): linking genomic+associated data with other data

- is becoming ever easier as databases grow (official ID, demographic, electoral roll, registration, certification, financial, marketing, telecommunication, genealogy, online social broadcasting...)
- often can narrow down to just a few possibilities.

Identifying tactic (c): profiling

- involves inferring traits from genotype
- is only "probabilistic," but is gaining scope and power as genomic science progresses
- now can deduce sex and blood type, likely skin pigmentation, freckling, hair thickness, curl, and color, eye color, basic frame and facial proportions, and some other physical attributes; some health factors; and maybe some behavioral attributes.

Identifiability and "human subject" status: the U.S. OHRP policy

"OHRP considers private information or specimens not to be individually identifiable when they cannot be linked to specific individuals by the investigator(s) either directly or indirectly through coding systems." [meaning key-coding]

Implication: If data are not identifiable *to the researchers*, there is no "human subject," and so full ethics review and/or consent may be unnecessary. **Important!**


Ref: U.S. Office for Human Research Protections (2008);
<http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/cdebiol.html>

A productive current approach: GWAS

- Genome-wide association studies (GWAS) search for associations between genomic variants and health factors, including drug-response factors
- May survey a million or more markers called SNPs in many thousands of subjects; being facilitated by biobanks and electronic health records
- Scientifically very productive; clinical application is beginning
- Results tend to be shared widely, but identifiability has to be tended to carefully. Most sharing is via restricted access.

A resource: "Catalog of published genome-wide association studies"; www.genome.gov/26525384.

2011 1st quarter



NHGRI GWA Catalog
www.genome.gov/GWAStudies

Abdominal aortic aneurysm	Coffee consumption	Hypospadias	Osteoarthritis
Acute lymphoblastic leukemia	Cognitive function	Idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis	Osteoporosis
Adhesion molecules	Conduct disorder	IgA levels	Otosclerosis
Adiponectin levels	Colorectal cancer	IgE levels	Other metabolic traits
Age-related macular degeneration	Corneal thickness	Inflammatory bowel disease	Ovarian cancer
AIDS progression	Coronary disease	Insulin-like growth factors	Pancreatic cancer
Alcohol dependence	Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease	Intracranial aneurysm	Pain
Alopecia areata	Crohn's disease	Iris color	Paget's disease
Alzheimer disease	Crohn's disease and celiac disease	Iron status markers	Panic disorder
Amyloid A levels	Cutaneous nevi	Ischemic stroke	Parkinson's disease
Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis	Dermatitis	Juvenile idiopathic arthritis	Periodontitis
Angiotensin-converting enzyme activity	Diabetic retinopathy	Keloid	Peripheral arterial disease
Ankylosing spondylitis	Drug-induced liver injury	Kidney stones	Personality dimensions
Arterial stiffness	Endometriosis	LDL cholesterol	Phosphatidylcholine levels
Asparagus anosmia	Eosinophil count	Leprosy	Phosphorus levels
Asthma	Eosinophilic esophagitis	Leptin receptor levels	Photic sneeze
Atherosclerosis in HIV	Erectile dysfunction and prostate cancer treatment	Liver enzymes	Phytosterol levels
Atrial fibrillation	Erythrocyte parameters	Longevity	Platelet count
Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder	Esophageal cancer	LP (a) levels	Polycystic ovary syndrome
Autism	Essential tremor	LpPLA(2) activity and mass	Primary biliary cirrhosis
Basal cell cancer	Exfoliation glaucoma	Lung cancer	Primary sclerosing cholangitis
Behcet's disease	Eye color traits	Magnesium levels	PR interval
Bipolar disorder	F cell distribution	Major mood disorders	Progranulin levels
Biliary atresia	Fibrinogen levels	Malaria	Prostate cancer
Bilirubin	Folate pathway vitamins	Male pattern baldness	Protein levels
Bitter taste response	Follicular lymphoma	Mammographic density	PSA levels
Birth weight	Fuch's corneal dystrophy	Matrix metalloproteinase levels	Psoriasis
Bladder cancer	Freckles and burning	MCP-1	Psoriatic arthritis
Bleomycin sensitivity	Gallstones	Melanoma	Pulmonary funct. COPD
Blond or brown hair	Gastric cancer	Menarche & menopause	QRS interval
Blood pressure	Glioma	Meningococcal disease	QT interval
Blue or green eyes	Glycemic traits	Metabolic syndrome	Quantitative traits
BMI, waist circumference	Hair color	Migraine	Recombination rate
Bone density	Hair morphology	Moyamoya disease	Red vs. non-red hair
Breast cancer	Handedness in dyslexia	Multiple sclerosis	Refractive error
C-reactive protein	HDL cholesterol	Myeloproliferative neoplasms	Renal cell carcinoma
Calcium levels	Heart failure	Narcolepsy	Renal function
Cardiac structure/function	Heart rate	Nasopharyngeal cancer	Response to antidepressants
Cardiovascular risk factors	Height	Natriuretic peptide levels	Response to antipsychotic therapy
Carnitine levels	Hemostasis parameters	Neuroblastoma	Response to carbamazepine
Carotenoid/tocopherol levels	Hepatic steatosis	Nicotine dependence	Response to hepatitis C treat
Celiac disease	Hepatitis	Obesity	Response to metformin
Celiac disease and rheumatoid arthritis	Hepatocellular carcinoma	Open angle glaucoma	Response to statin therapy
Cerebral atrophy measures	Hirschsprung's disease	Open personality	Restless legs syndrome
Chronic lymphocytic leukemia	HIV-1 control	Optic disc parameters	Retinal vascular caliber
	Hodgkin's lymphoma		Rheumatoid arthritis
			Ribavirin-induced anemia
			Schizophrenia
			Serum metabolites
			Skin pigmentation
			Smoking behavior
			Speech perception
			Sphingolipid levels
			Statin-induced myopathy
			Stroke
			Suicide attempts
			Systemic lupus erythematosus
			Systemic sclerosis
			T-tau levels
			Tau AB1-42 levels
			Telomere length
			Testicular germ cell tumor
			Thyroid cancer
			Tooth development
			Total cholesterol
			Triglycerides
			Tuberculosis
			Type 1 diabetes
			Type 2 diabetes
			Ulcerative colitis
			Urate
			Urinary albumin excretion
			Venous thromboembolism
			Ventricular conduction
			Vertical cup-disc ratio
			Vitamin B12 levels
			Vitamin D insufficiency
			Vitiligo
			Warfarin dose
			Weight
			White cell count
			YKL-40 levels

Ex: Vanderbilt University BioVU

- Performs GWAS using:
 - clinical samples scheduled to be destroyed
 - a "synthetic derivative" of the data in electronic health records
- Informs patients and the public via notices, brochures, and newspaper articles; provides for easy opting-out at any time
- Randomly excludes 2% of samples so it isn't possible to know whether a patient is represented in the database
- Manages research access via a tight data use agreement.
(BioVU is part of a 7-center consortium called eMERGE.)

Aggregating isn't what it used to be

- Until 2008, in order to protect the identities of the data-subjects, high-level data from GWAS and other data-sets were posted on the web in aggregated, i.e., pooled, form.
- Then in late 2008 it was shown that individual genotypes can be distinguished in mixtures of DNA from 100 or more people, and so can detect whether a query genotype is present
- Now most extensive genome data are shared via restricted access (under permissions, commitments, and safeguards...), or via highly restricted access (data enclaves).

Ref: Nils Homer et al., *PLoS Genetics* 4(8): e1000167 (2008).

The protections relied on

- De-identification – a long story, but nonetheless...
- Restriction of access, internally and when transferring or sharing data, limiting to certified external researchers, etc.
- Perhaps managing data via resource platforms, elaborate linkage systems, or data enclaves
- Safeguarding, safeguarding, safeguarding
- Penalizing inappropriate releases and uses.
- [Or, releasing data openly but with full and understanding assumption of risk by the data-subjects, as the Personal Genome Project does.]

The Personal Genome Project: a foreshadowing of the future?

- Led by George Church at Harvard, who believes that current consent is illegitimate and that safeguards can't be relied on
- Hopes to recruit 100,000 volunteers (has 1,100 now)
- Puts candidates through an extensive educational process, and then documents consent to having extensive health information and full genome published openly on the web.

See handout...

Refs: <http://www.personalgenomes.org>; and

John Conley et al., "Enabling responsible public genomics," *Health Matrix* 20, 325-385 (2010); http://www.genomicslawreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Health_Matrix_-_Journal_of_Law-Medicine_Vol_20_2010.pdf

Opposing extreme models of data access

- At one extreme: Sequester data tightly and manage access, mainly to at least partially de-identified data, via data enclaves (safe havens, research data centers, etc.)
- At the other extreme: Release identified data openly, with consent.
- In-between...?

Two conjectures, inviting reaction

- As genomic science becomes ever more sophisticated, the cost of sequencing and other genotyping techniques continues to drop, genotyping becomes more routine, genomic databases continue to grow, and pedigree data are released publicly by genealogy databases, the identifiability of genomic data generally will increase.
- As genomic data become integrated with, or linked to, electronic health records, disease and other registries, social databases, and research databases, the identifiability of the data in those collections will also tend to increase.

Some continuing issues

- Acceptability of broad consent, the ethical status of data that are not identifiable to the researcher, and so on
- What consent, assent, authorization, or other permission should consist in for complex research
- How to deal with identifiability issues: in policy, and in practice
- Whether any rights adhere to biospecimens or data after they have been thoroughly dissociated from a person
- Ethical obligations to relatives
- Relation of genomics with notions of ancestry, race, ethnicity
- How to manage genotype data linked to networked electronic health records.